From the viewpoint of Pareto optimality, goods with increasing returns are under-produced relative to those without increasing returns; goods with higher degrees of increasing returns are under-produced relative to those with lower degrees. Ignoring administrative and indirect (such as rent-seeking) costs, subsidies on goods produced under conditions of (high degrees of) increasing returns financed by taxes on goods produced under non-increasing and lower

The general case
First, from an average-cost pricing equilibrium as established in the previous chapter, we have, as a condition for market equilibrium, g. This definition of the degree of g g increasing returns describes a situation of constant/decreasing returns as one having a zero/negative degree of increasing returns, as intuitively agreeable. This is convenient as it allows us to compare two goods in terms of their degrees of increasing returns, covering all cases of increasing, constant, and decreasing returns. This definition may be applied either to increasing returns at the firm or industry level, depending on the interpretation of G g G . Since we are mainly concerned with firm-level increasing returns here, G g G is taken as the output level of firm g g. (With increasing g g returns, equilibrium implies a downward-sloping demand curve. Hence it is more appropriate to regard each firm as producing a distinct good, making the distinction of the firm and the industry no longer relevant.)
Each consumer maximizes a utility function
where some of the gth 'goods' could be the negative amounts of (labour) services performed. (This notational convention differs from that of the previous chapter, but the essential substance does not differ.) The firstorder conditions for an interior solution to this maximization problem are G is the marginal utility of good g g to individual g i. Eq. 5.5 specifies the equality of (absolute) MRS (marginal rate of substitution) for any pair of goods with the price ratio. The second-order
